Worker separations in a nonstationary corporate environment by Dohmen, T.J. & Pfann, G.A.
  
 
Worker separations in a nonstationary corporate
environment
Citation for published version (APA):
Dohmen, T. J., & Pfann, G. A. (2004). Worker separations in a nonstationary corporate environment.
European Economic Review, 48(3), 645-663. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00067-9
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2004
DOI:
10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00067-9
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
European Economic Review 48 (2004) 645–663
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
Worker separations in a nonstationary
corporate environment
Thomas J. Dohmena ;∗, Gerard A. Pfanna;b;c
aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA), P.O. Box 7240, 53072 Bonn, Germany
bMaastricht University, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
cCEPR, London, UK
Accepted 21 March 2003
Abstract
Assessing ten years of unique personnel data from a large 0rm, this paper investigates how
determinants of worker turnover di1er between periods of corporate expansion and decline. Per-
formance and career progress considerably reduce the hazard of job separation during downsizing
for blue-collar workers, but are less important for white-collar workers. E1ects of 0rm-tenure,
occupation, education, training, part-time status, and gender are largely in accordance with the
implications from existing models. But no model generates all patterns observed in the data.
Age e1ects are sensitive to retirement options and discontinuous, dropping in response to the
anticipation of becoming eligible for early retirement during downsizing and jumping at the
actual retirement age.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classi2cation: J63; J26; M12
Keywords: Worker turnover; Personnel economics
1. Introduction
This paper asks how determinants of worker turnover di1er between times of cor-
porate expansion and corporate decline. We exploit a unique personnel data set from a
very large 0rm to analyze the determinants of job separations. The data set has detailed
information on the internal labor market careers of 17,610 workers employed during a
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ten year period which is marked by an episode of corporate expansion and an episode
of severe downsizing leading to bankruptcy in the end, so that we can assess how
the determinants of separation rates modify when economic conditions change. Since
we have information on performance evaluations and promotions, we investigate in
particular how career development a1ects job separation in a nonstationary corporate
environment.
At least two important aspects di1erentiate our study from previous empirical work
that investigated the relationship between separation rates of workers and their charac-
teristics (e.g. Farber, 1994; Gautier et al., 1999). First, rather than using data sampled
over di1erent 0rms and/or over di1erent industries, we have data on the entire popula-
tion of workers from a single 0rm during a period of almost ten years. Heterogeneity
emanating from 0rm-speci0c or industry-speci0c e1ects is less of a concern since all
workers face the same set of personnel policies. In addition, the personnel data are
less prone to measurement error and recall problems than survey data. The second new
characteristic of our analysis is that our data cover a period of corporate growth and
an episode of corporate decline. The analysis of such data not only adds an additional
dimension to the evaluation of theories of worker turnover, but is also relevant for
labor market Dow theories in general. 1
We estimate hazard rates for the event of a job separation. In order to allow for a
Dexible baseline hazard, we choose a Cox proportional hazard model and reverse the
role of calendar time and tenure duration to control for the nonstationary environment.
We prefer a Dexible parameterization of the duration dependence and the functional
form of the dependence on other covariates. Although Dexibility comes at the price of
eEciency loss, the size and quality of our data set enables us to achieve a high degree
of estimates’ precision.
The results show that promotions lower turnover and that blue-collar workers with
low performance evaluations, but not white-collar workers with low performance, are
the 0rst to leave in downturns. The e1ect of tenure, education, training, blue-collar
vs. white-collar employment, and part-time work are in line with the predictions of
turnover theories although no single theory can explain all facts. Consistent with the-
oretical predictions we 0nd that young workers have higher separation rates, but we
discover important discontinuities of separation hazards at older age resulting from
early retirement options. Such institutional arrangements and the anticipation of them
have important implications not only for the design of human resource policies, but
also for empirical work because simple functional forms, such as a quadratic age e1ect,
do not describe the data well and miss important features of reality.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3
discusses implications of di1erent models that we assess with our data. Section 4
presents the econometric model, a Cox proportional hazard model with calendar time
dependence, which the data lend themselves to. Section 5 discusses the estimation
results and their implications for the theoretical models. Section 6 concludes.
1 How the determinants of worker turnover vary with the level of economic activity is a relevant question
for Dow theories of unemployment (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).
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Table 1
Fokker subsidiaries and plant locations
Subsidiary Location name Plant locations
Fokker Administration FAC1 Amsterdam
Fokker Aircraft FAC1 Schiphol
Fokker Aircraft FAC2 Papendrecht/Dordrecht
Fokker Aircraft FAC3 Ypenburg
Fokker Space and Systems FSS Leiden
Fokker ELMO ELMO Woensdrecht
Fokker Special Products FSP Hoogeveen
Fokker Aircraft Services FAS Woensdrecht
Note: Fokker Administration is located in the city of Amsterdam. In the data, it has the same location
name (FAC1) as the main assembly plant at Schiphol, which is due to historical reasons.
2. The data
The data come from the personnel 0les of the Dutch national aircraft manufac-
turer N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Vliegtuigenfabriek Fokker (Fokker N.V.). These
0les contain detailed information on the work histories of all 17,610 workers who
had a permanent work contract with the 0rm at some time in the period from
January 1, 1987, until March 15, 1996. 2 During this period, Fokker N.V. was struc-
tured in an administration unit (Fokker Administration B.V.), an aircraft production
unit (Fokker Aircraft B.V.), as well as four other subsidiaries (Fokker Space and Sys-
tems, Fokker ELMO, Fokker Special Products, and Fokker Aircraft Services). The core
business, aircraft manufacturing, was organized in three plants of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
(Schiphol, Papendrecht/Dordrecht, and Ypenburg) with headquarters, Fokker Adminis-
tration B.V., in Amsterdam. The other four subsidiaries are vested in di1erent locations
(see Table 1 for an overview).
Distressed by the adverse economic conditions that had a1ected the entire industry
from the early 1990s on, Fokker N.V., its production unit, and its administration unit
0led for bankruptcy on March 15, 1996. 3 The other viable parts of the 0rm – Fokker
ELMO, Fokker Special Products, and Fokker Aircraft Services – did not enter the
bankruptcy procedure and were sold. 4
2 The data were made available to us for academic purposes by the company’s bankruptcy trustees. The
report of the bankruptcy trustees is publicly available (Deterink et al., 1997).
3 This might prompt the criticism that the 0rm is not a representative example of a downsizing 0rm as it
fails eventually. However, there is reason to believe that the collapse came suddenly and unexpectedly. Most
analysts expected that Fokker would survive. A comment in the Wall Street Journal on September 4, 1995,
describes the market sentiment: “Few, however, expect DASA, the aerospace arm of German industrial giant
Daimler-Benz AG, will let Fokker go bust. The Dutch company [ : : : ] 0lls a key niche in a market segment
expected to show strong growth in the next few years” (du Bois, 1995).
4 Fokker Space and Systems (FSS) had already been spun o1 in December 1995. Workers employed at
this division leave our data 0les on that date.
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Panel (a) of Fig. 1 illustrates that demand in the two market segments for
40–70 seater and 70–125 seater aircraft, for which the 0rm produced, collapsed in
1990. The global slump in aircraft demand was partly a consequence of deregulation of
the aviation industry. But the severity of the crisis resulted largely from adverse e1ects
of the Gulf War on the aviation industry, which hit the 0rm unexpectedly. Panel (b)
of Fig. 1 shows how employment dynamics responded to changes in aircraft demand.
Employment in the entire company grew steadily from 10,215 permanent workers to
12,813 permanent workers from 1987 until 1991. Forced by the sharp global drop in
aircraft demand, the 0rm announced the 0rst of a series of reorganizations with work-
force reduction on March 1, 1991. The vast majority of workers was employed in the
company’s core business operation, Fokker Aircraft, which was also a1ected most by
the severe downturn.
The data lend themselves for duration analysis as they record each worker’s accession
and job separation date, birth date, as well as the timing of other relevant events, in-
cluding changes in individual characteristics (education, training courses, marital status,
and performance), job characteristics (hours worked, location of work), and compen-
sation (position in the salary system).
3. Implications from turnover models
The joint expected surplus Sit of the employment relation between the 0rm and
worker i at time t is the central theme that connects alternative turnover theories. It
can be expressed as
Sit = Vit − Ait +
∫ T
t
Et(Vis − Ais |
s) ds;
where Vit denotes the value of the worker i to the 0rm in period t and Ait the value of
the outside option to the worker. 5 Et(Vis−Ais |
s) denotes the expectation of Vis−Ais
conditional on the information available at t, 
t . The expected surplus is stochastic as
future realizations of V and A depend on random shocks to productivity, demand, and
prices. An option value exists, Oit , as 0rms and workers can decide to separate in the
future, thereby limiting losses. The option value of a separation is higher, the larger
the variance of future surpluses. 6
An eEcient separation takes place if the joint expected surplus falls below the costs
of separation C and the option value O associated with a separation. IneEcient separa-
tions can result when there are informational asymmetries about outside options (Hall
and Lazear, 1984) or when speci0c investments are not veri0able (see Teulings and
Hartog, 1998).
The probability that worker i separates at time t given that he did not separate
before, Pit , i.e. the hazard of job separation of worker i at time t, is a function of
the expected surplus net of separation costs and the option value of the separation,
5 Without loss of generality, we have normalized the alternative option of the 0rm to equal zero.
6 Pfann (2001) shows how uncertainty about the future creates an option value of waiting when separations
are irreversible.
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Fig. 1. Aircraft demand and employment dynamics. (a) Orders, deliveries, and remaining orders of aircraft
and (b) workforce.
Notes: 1. Panel (a) shows the sum of total world orders, orders of Fokker aircraft, deliver-
ies of Fokker aircraft, and total remaining orders for the two market segments of 40–70 seater and
70–125 seater aircraft. Fokker orders shown in the 0gure are corrected for cancellations, and consequently
do not include the option of 127 Fokker 100 aircraft, which were part of agreements with American Airlines
and Guiness Peat Aviation that were placed in 1989 but that were never exercised. The numbers in the
0gure are based on information provided in Deterink et al. (1997). 2. Panel (b) plots the number of workers
with a permanent contract employed in the entire 0rm (graph labelled “total”) and its subsidiaries (FAC1,
FAC2, FAC3, FAS, FSP, FSS, ELMO; see Table 1 for a de0nition) at the beginning of each month from
January 1987 until March 1996.
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i.e. Pit = F(Sit − Cit − Oit). Factors that augment the joint surplus are predicted to
reduce the hazard of job separation. Match-speci0c capital (Jovanovic, 1979a) and
relationship-speci0c investments (Oi, 1962), like 0rm-speci0c training are inversely
related to turnover rates. Lower turnover rates, on the other hand, stimulate higher
levels of speci0c investments. Firms could foster long-term employment relations by
instituting a deferred compensation scheme (Lazear, 1979), which suggests that sep-
aration rates rise for older workers and workers with longer tenure when the 0rm
is hit by a shock a1ecting the marginal value product. When 0rm-speci0c skills (Becker,
1962) or organization capital (Prescott and Visscher, 1980) is accumulated on-the-job,
separations are negatively related to 0rm tenure (cf. Mortensen, 1978). The negative
dependence of the separation hazard on job tenure is reinforced by decreasing search
behavior in Jovanovic’s (1979b) analysis which combines job-speci0c human capital
accumulation and search behavior.
Since it is reasonable to assume that relation-speci0c capital is accumulated with job
tenure at di1erent rates (Dustmann and Meghir, 1998), we expect workers who have
made careers within the 0rm (which we measure by upward mobility in the 0rm’s
salary scales) and workers with high performance evaluations to have lower separation
rates, ceteris paribus.
4. The econometric model
The hazard of job separation is expected to change substantially with calendar time.
Therefore, it is natural to estimate a mixed proportional hazard model in which we
reverse the role of calendar time and duration as worked out by Imbens (1994). Since
all workers in the data are employed at the same company, heterogeneity arising from
0rm-speci0c and industry-speci0c e1ects is ruled out in our application. By reversing
the role of calendar time and duration, we control for unobserved heterogeneity that
is independent of covariates, not individual-speci0c, and varying over time. Calendar
time e1ects, i.e. the impact of nonstationary forces on the job separation hazard, enter
the hazard rate through the baseline hazard and are not parameterized in the Cox
proportional hazard model. A piece-wise constant step function
!k(t − t0) = I [dk ¡ t − t06dk+1]
is speci0ed to estimate the duration dependence of job tenure (t− t0) in a Dexible way,
where I is the indicator function, dk+1 − dk a particular period length, and t0 and t
are the entry date and the calendar date, respectively. The hazard rate  depends on
calendar time t, on the accession date t0, and on a set of time-invariant and time-varying
characteristics in our design matrix X . The hazard rate is given by
(t; t0; X (t)) = 0(t) expX (t) exp
K∑
k=1
k!k(t − t0): (1)
Workers are in the risk pool from the starting date of analysis time, ts if they
are employed at ts and their hiring date, t0, is prior to the analysis time, i.e. t0¡ts.
Workers hired during the analysis time, i.e. for whom t0¿ ts, enter the risk pool at
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the day of accession to the 0rm. Workers leave the risk pool on the day of separation,
or if their spell is censored. Such right-censoring occurs due to a worker’s death or
due to spin-o1s in which workers do not lose their job but leave our data 0les as their
employer changes. Since we know the beginning date of an employment spell, t0, for
all spells, we condition on elapsed tenure duration at the beginning of analysis time ts
and, consequently, infer the duration dependence of employment spells.
In the estimation, we divide tenure duration into 27 intervals. In order to assess
whether the separation hazard increases initially, we de0ne intervals of one week for
the 0rst 12 weeks and of 3-months length for the remainder of the 0rst year. Since the
distribution of tenure at the 0rm is skewed, we enlarge the interval length at longer
tenure choosing intervals of 1-year length for the second until the 0fth year and of
5-years length thereafter. The covariance matrix X includes controls for age, education,
work-related training incidences, wage scales, performance evaluation scores, part-time
work, gender, marital status, and having had a previous employment spell with the
0rm. 7
In order to leave the functional form of the dependence on age Dexible, we de0ne a
step function with yearly intervals. 8 We include categorical dummy variables for the
highest obtained schooling degree (see Table 2). 9 We control for work-related training
incidences by four variables, two of which are time-invariant and count, respectively,
the number of external training courses completed before 1987 and the number of inter-
nal training courses completed before 1987, while the other two variables – the number
of external and internal training courses completed during the observation period – vary
over time. 10
We account for the 18 di1erent wage scales that exist at the 0rm. These wage scales
also determine the split into white-collar and blue-collar employment. Workers in the
10 lower wage scales (scales 2–11), referred to as “blue-collar workers”, are bound by
collective wage bargaining agreements and are predominately employed in production.
Workers in the higher scales (12–19) are referred to as “white-collar workers”. Their
wages are not bound by collective wage bargaining agreements. Most workers at the
0rm are blue-collar workers. We hold the 0rst observed wage scale of a worker constant
and include dummy variables that trace transitions in wage scales. By March 1991, only
0.4% of those who are still employed moved down the wage ladder. Upward moves
are more common: 31.4% have moved up one scale, 17.7% two scales, and 7.9% three
or more scales.
There are 6 performance evaluation scores for blue-collar workers and 5 for white-
collar workers, for each of which we de0ne a dummy variable. Table 3 illustrates that
the distribution of evaluation scores is left-skewed, but strongly concentrated around
7 During the entire period, there are only 329 workers who are rehired.
8 The age distribution among separating workers is not unimodal in the two periods. A 0rst peak arises
at the age of 25 years in both periods. The modal age at job separation is 60 years in the 0rst period, but
becomes 55 in the second period.
9 We de0ne the category “not reported” in order not to lose valuable information on those whose schooling
degree is not reported in the data.
10 Internal courses are training provided at the 0rm in the company’s school, while external instructors are
hired for external courses.
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Table 2
Schooling degrees
Education description Type of education
lo Basic education
lbo Lower vocational degree
mavo Lower general schooling degree
llw Apprenticeship
havo Intermediate general schooling degree
mbo Intermediate vocational degree
vwo Higher general schooling degree
hbo Higher vocational degree
uni University/technical college
Note: The general schooling degrees, like basic education, lower, intermediate and higher general schooling
degrees are prerequisites for pursuing a given vocational or general education in the Dutch educational
system. Basic education is a prerequisite for any other degree. After having completed basic education, it is
possible to either follow a lower vocational schooling course or to attend any of the school forms leading
to a general schooling degree. Lower general education (mavo) makes one eligible to follow intermediate
vocational training or complete an apprenticeship. An intermediate general schooling degree quali0es for
higher vocational schooling, a higher general schooling degree (havo) quali0es for higher vocational schooling
(hbo), while the highest level general schooling degree (vwo) is a prerequisite for pursuing a college or
university degree. In addition, it is possible to pursue the next higher schooling level after having obtained
a given schooling degree; similarly it is possible to enter the next higher level of vocational schooling
after having completed vocational schooling at the level just below, e.g. after having completed intermediate
vocational schooling one is eligible to enter higher vocational schooling.
Table 3
De0nition and distribution of performance evaluation scores
Score Blue-collar workers White-collar workers
employed on March 1, 1991 employed on March 1, 1991
De0nition Distribution De0nition Distribution
1 Falls behind 0.13 Unsatisfactory 0.15
2 Unsatisfactory 1.14 Satisfactory 2.89
3 Normal–good 49.84 Good 84.65
4 Good–very good 36.52 Very good 12.14
5 Very good–outstanding 11.06 Outstanding 0.15
6 Excellent 1.31
Total 100.00 100.00
Performance evaluation scores are given by supervisors and must be approved of by the human resource
department. Evaluation scores are typically given once a year after evaluation talks have taken place and
refer to the performance in the past year.
the median: 86.4% of blue-workers employed on March 1, 1991, have scores in the cat-
egories “normal–good” or “good–very good” and 84.7% of the white-collar workforce
were evaluated as “good”.
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In order to account for the fact that the negative shock did not a1ect the di1erent parts
of the 0rm with the same intensity, we allow the baseline hazard to di1er across plants.
Moreover, we relax the assumption that nonstationary forces a1ect di1erent groups
of workers proportionally by stratifying the sample into white-collar and blue-collar
workers. 11
Since the determinants of relative separation rates might di1er between times of
expansion and downsizing, we estimate model (1) separately for the period of expansion
and the period of downsizing, splitting the period on March 1, 1991, the day when
the 0rst downsizing operation was announced. Our analysis time of the second period
ends on March 14, 1996, one day before the bankruptcy, when we censor observations
of workers still employed on March 15, 1996.
We checked the robustness of our speci0cation by restricting the parameter vec-
tor  in di1erent ways and by di1erent forms of strati0cation. CoeEcient estimates
are generally robust in the sense that the exclusion of variables does not have a sig-
ni0cant e1ect on other estimated coeEcients. 12 CoeEcient estimates are also robust
when the baseline hazard is allowed to di1er across strata for gender or part-time
workers.
5. Estimation results
5.1. Baseline hazards
An inspection of the baseline hazards, which are estimated separately for blue-collar
and white-collar workers at the di1erent plants, reveals large di1erences between the
period of workforce expansion and the period of downsizing, thus highlighting the
importance of controlling for nonstationarity. Fig. 2 plots the baseline hazards for
blue-collar and white-collar workers at the largest subsidiary, FAC1. 13 The hazard
rate of a job separation is rather Dat in the period of expansion until 1991, while it is
much more erratic and considerably higher during downsizing, especially from 1993
onwards. The baseline hazard does not rise sharply between 1991 and 1993 when
employment is contracting which suggests that workforce reductions prior to 1993
are mainly accomplished by reducing hiring and/or that job cuts are born largely by
11 We found important di1erences in baseline hazard rates for blue-collar and white-collar workers when
we strati0ed the sample with respect to worker status. Since the 0t of the model improves signi0cantly when
we stratify the sample, we estimate the parameter of model (1) separately for the sub-samples of blue-collar
and white-collar workers.
12 Leaving out dummies for wage scales a1ects estimated coeEcients for education levels and measures of
career attainment due to the high correlation between schooling credentials and wage scales. The impact of
education on separation rates can, therefore, be decomposed into two e1ects: the e1ect of education given
the job level and the e1ect of education on the probability of attaining a particular job level.
13 The shape of the baseline hazard at other subsidiaries are similar, especially at the plants FAC2, and
FAC3 which together with FAC1 constitute the core business aircraft manufacturing that accounts on average
for 78% of employment.
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Fig. 2. Baseline hazards at FAC1. (a) Blue-collar workers and (b) white-collar workers.
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particular groups of the workforce. 14 The baseline hazard rate peaks in 1993, 1994, and
1995 for both types of workers, but these peaks are more pronounced for blue-collar
workers, especially in the earlier years 1993 and 1994. 15 In fact, while white-collar
workers are more likely to separate than blue-collar workers during expansion, the
opposite is true during downsizing. 16
5.2. Promotions and performance
Separation rates of workers in higher wage scales – and, therefore, workers in higher
hierarchical positions 17 – are less a1ected by downsizing. Relative separation rates of
white-collar workers in the highest scales, scales 18 and 19, fall most, while blue-collar
workers in the bottom scales (3–6) become more likely to separate. 18
Promotions in wage scales have a strong and signi0cant negative e1ect on separa-
tion rates for blue-collar workers in both periods. The more frequently a blue-collar
worker is promoted, the less likely he becomes to separate. This e1ect becomes par-
ticularly strong during expansion. Having climbed up more than 1 scale does not
a1ect the separation hazard of white-collar workers signi0cantly in both periods, yet
moving down in the salary system more than doubles the hazard of job separation
(see Table 4) of white-collar workers during downsizing.
Performance evaluation scores have strong and signi0cant e1ects throughout
(Table 4). The better a worker’s performance, the less likely he is to separate. This
holds for both periods and both types of workers and is strong evidence for the gen-
eral notion that low-surplus matches end early. Hazard rates of blue-collar workers with
lowest scores are 78% higher than for those in the reference group during expansion
and 458% during downsizing. Having an above median evaluation score becomes more
important for job security of blue-collar workers in the period of downsizing as the
p-values show. The e1ects of performance evaluations do not change for white-collar
workers between the regime of workforce expansion and the episode of workforce
contraction. This surprising di1erence in e1ects performance evaluations have on the
turnover propensity of the two types of workers has not been found nor explained
before.
14 This squares nicely with our prior knowledge that workforce reductions were mainly accomplished by
usual attrition including retirement, but also early retirement prior to 1993 (Deterink et al., 1997) which
shows up in an increase in the estimated age coeEcient for workers at early retirement age.
15 Hazard rates increase most markedly in 1993 at production sites of Fokker Aircraft (FAC1, FAC2, and
FAC3). The hazard rate is highest at location FAC3 in 1995 when there were plans of closing that site. See
Deterink et al. (1997) for more details on such plans.
16 Such asymmetric downsizing may result from di1erences in adjustment costs and a perception that the
crisis is temporary (cf. Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996).
17 Hierarchical job levels and wage scales are strongly correlated.
18 White-collar workers in the highest wage scale are typically assigned to the third highest hierarchical
level. The ‘Executive Board’, which consisted of a group of three managers most of the time, and directors of
subdivisions who compose the second highest hierarchy level are excluded from the study because information
on their earnings history is not provided for con0dentiality reasons.
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Table 4
Promotions and performance
Blue-collar workers White-collar workers
1987–1991 1991–1996 p-values 1987–1991 1991–1996 p-values
 Salary scale ¡0 0.153 −0.205 0.044 −0.344 0.707 0.003
(0.363) (0.178) (1.011) (0.354)∗
+1 −0.424 −0.148 0.000 −0.449 −0.089 0.000
(0.064)∗∗ (0.041)∗∗ (0.154)∗∗ (0.086)
+2 −0.645 −0.240 0.000 0.194 −0.179 0.000
(0.128)∗∗ (0.051)∗∗ (0.203) (0.107)
¿ 3 −0.867 −0.296 0.000 0.012 −0.092 0.395
(0.323)∗∗ (0.063)∗∗ (0.249) (0.122)
Performance
Score 1 0.574 1.501 0.002 3.011 2.530 0.097
(0.335) (0.307)∗∗ (0.284)∗∗ (0.290)∗∗
2 0.832 0.599 0.007 0.643 0.760 0.319
(0.113)∗∗ (0.087)∗∗ (0.140)∗∗ (0.118)∗∗
4 −0.179 −0.207 0.399 −0.066 −0.086 0.824
(0.057)∗∗ (0.033)∗∗ (0.123) (0.087)
5 −0.169 −0.426 0.000 −1.345 −1.034 0.495
(0.089) (0.062)∗∗ (0.540)∗ (0.456)∗
6 −0.153 −0.426 0.033
(0.150) (0.128)∗∗
Missing 0.870 −0.023
(0.154)∗∗ (0.464)
Observations 189,988 135,195 60,706 63,192
Notes: 1. The regression model includes regressors for tenure, age, education, training courses, wage
scales, changes in wage scales, performance evaluation scores, marital status, gender, part-time work, an
being rehired. 2. Reported coeEcients measure the e1ect on the log hazard and ought to be interpreted
as follows: A unit change in a covariate x changes the log hazard by the amount of x , where x is the
estimated coeEcient of covariate x. Since a unit change in x changes the hazard by approximately  ∗ 100%
for values of  close to zero, we can interpret coeEcients of categorical variables as semi-elasticities. 3. The
column labelled “p-value” reports the p-values for the test that the coeEcient in the second period equals
the point estimate of the coeEcient in the 0rst period, to give an indication whether coeEcients di1er in the
two sub-periods. 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes that the coeEcient is signi0cant
at the 5% level, two asterisks denote signi0cance at the 1% level. 5. Performance Evaluation Scores are
de0ned in Table 3.
5.3. Valuable speci2c skills
Consistent with the predictions from turnover models, we 0nd that workers with
speci0c skills face lower separation rates. We also 0nd that the separation rates of
workers with more valuable 0rm-speci0c skills are a1ected less during downsizing.
First, the negative duration dependence after 1–2 years of tenure – see Fig. 3, which
plots the elements of the estimated coeEcient vector  from Eq. (1) for blue-collar
and white-collar workers in the di1erent period – is in agreement with the predic-
tions of matching models (e.g. Jovanovic, 1979b) and models with speci0c capital
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Fig. 3. Duration dependence of job tenure. (a) Blue-collar workers in 0rst year, (b) blue-collar workers after
0rst year, (c) white-collar workers in 0rst year and (d) white-collar workers after 0rst year.
Notes: Workers in the reference group are 35 years of age. CoeEcient estimates that di1er signi0cantly
at the 1%-level are marked by triangles. A ‘+’ denotes signi0cance at the 5%-level. A square indicates that
the coeEcient in the second period di1ers signi0cantly (1%-level) from the coeEcient point estimate in the
0rst period.
accumulation on-the-job (e.g. Mortensen, 1978). The nonmonotonicity early during the
employment relation is consistent with Jovanovic’s (1979a) model that predicts ris-
ing separation rates in the 0rst weeks of the employment relation, as it takes time
for workers to accumulate suEcient “bad” information about their match that makes
a separation optimal. 19 The positive duration dependence at long job tenure can be
ascribed to retirement.
Relative separation rates change during downsizing, when workers with 1–5 years of
tenure and workers with more than 30 years of tenure become relatively more likely to
separate. The higher hazard at short tenure, especially during the 0rst 5 years, suggests
that those who had least time to accumulate 0rm-speci0c skills, become more likely to
19 Note that the models of Mortensen (1978) and of Jovanovic (1979b) do not generate the turnover pattern
at the beginning of the match that Jovanovic (1979a) predicts and that we observe in our data. Jovanovic
(1979a), on the other hand, neglects the e1ect of on-the-job human capital acquisition. Moreover, the model
cannot explain a negative e1ect of experience on the separation hazard holding 0rm tenure constant.
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separate. 20 The increase in the hazard rate at long tenure suggests that early retirement
occurs more frequently in the period of downsizing.
Second, vocationally educated workers (lbo, llw, mbo, and hbo) have lower sepa-
ration rates than those with a general education (lo, mavo, havo, or vwo). Blue-collar
workers with an apprenticeship and white-collar workers with an intermediate voca-
tional degree face the lowest separation rates. Since apprenticeships are commonly
completed at Fokker and since such vocational schooling o1ered by the 0rm is likely
to teach 0rm-speci0c skills and knowledge, our results (see Table 5) suggest that sepa-
ration rates are lower the more 0rm-speci0c a worker’s human capital is. 21 In periods
of turmoil, vocationally trained workers, especially blue-collar workers, and workers in
more complex jobs, who commonly have attained higher educational credentials, face
a lower increase in separation rates.
Third, a completed internal or external training course reduces the hazard rate of all
workers signi0cantly in the period of downsizing. Training courses completed prior to
1987 have a smaller e1ect on separation rates suggesting depreciation of skills acquired
in these courses. 22 Finally, workers who are rehired during the downsizing period face
a lower risk of job separation, but the e1ect is not signi0cant.
5.4. Age
Fig. 4, which plots the coeEcient estimates for the di1erent age categories for
blue-collar (Panel (a)) and white-collar workers (Panel (b)), shows that the e1ects
of age on separation rates are not smooth. The discontinuous drops and jumps
around early retirement age are not captured adequately by common param-
etric speci0cations or lower order polynomials – even not by a seventh order
polynomial. 23
The hazard rate for blue-collar workers younger than 40 years of age is rather Dat,
while it decreases faster with age for white-collar workers. 24 Di1erent from the results
20 A LIFO-layo1 rule is also consistent with Kuhn and Robert’s (1989) model of rent extraction. How-
ever, there is no evidence of an unconditional LIFO-layo1 rule in our data, as workers with poor perfor-
mance scores and workers with lower level educational degrees also become more likely to separate during
downsizing.
21 More than 57% of the workers who join the 0rm after 1987 and complete a higher degree during the
employment spell complete an apprenticeship, 18% complete intermediate vocational schooling, 8% higher
vocational schooling.
22 It might seem puzzling that “external” courses which supposedly teach more general skills have a larger
negative e1ect on the hazard than courses followed at the company. But since we only control for the
number of courses, it is possible that courses provided by an external agency represent a larger investment
in terms of hours and costs and their content might be partly 0rm-speci0c. A more puzzling result is that
the e1ect of training courses is much lower and even insigni0cant for some types of courses in the second
period.
23 Existing studies often 0t a quadratic age e1ect. Typically these studies estimate the minimum separation
rates to occur at age 35–40. In fact, we have simulated this approach by also 0tting a quadratic age e1ect
in our data and found the minimum to be at age 36.8 for the pooled sample.
24 General skills are typically more important for white-collar workers who are therefore more likely to
engage in job-shopping.
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Table 5
Education and training
Highest degree Blue-collar workers White-collar workers
1987–1991 1991–1996 p-values 1987–1991 1991–1996 p-values
Not reported 0.559 0.026 0.000 0.105 0.013 0.606
(0.075)∗∗ (0.046) (0.320) (0.177)
lo 0.428 −0.025 0.000
(0.160)∗∗ (0.124)
lbo 0.178 0.112 0.134 −0.531 0.021 0.020
(0.076)∗ (0.044)∗ (0.374) (0.237)
mavo 0.299 0.032 0.000 −0.545 −0.043 0.041
(0.091)∗∗ (0.060) (0.378) (0.246)
llw Reference Reference Reference Reference
group group group group
havo 0.574 0.077 0.000 −0.094 0.084 0.485
(0.122)∗∗ (0.097) (0.443) (0.254)
mbo 0.292 −0.007 0.000 −0.858 −0.271 0.002
(0.082)∗∗ (0.051) (0.365)∗ (0.188)
vwo 0.658 −0.101 0.000 −0.218 −0.231 0.950
(0.156)∗∗ (0.142) (0.351) (0.205)
hbo 0.349 0.153 0.144 −0.421 −0.260 0.371
(0.168)∗ (0.134) (0.325) (0.180)
univ/th −0.030 0.826 0.002 −0.315 −0.164 0.419
(0.509) (0.282)∗∗ (0.331) (0.187)
Training courses
Internal since 1987 −0.067 −0.005 0.000 −0.157 −0.020 0.000
(0.009)∗∗ (0.003) (0.042)∗∗ (0.009)∗
External since 1987 −0.183 −0.055 0.000 −0.197 0.023 0.000
(0.064)∗∗ (0.018)∗∗ (0.063)∗∗ (0.019)
Internal before 1987 −0.017 −0.009 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.893
(0.005)∗∗ (0.004)∗ (0.013) (0.008)
External before 1987 −0.010 0.029 0.011 −0.012 −0.007 0.814
(0.021) (0.015) (0.029) (0.021)
Observations 189,988 135,195 60,706 63,192
Notes: 1. The regression model includes regressors for tenure, age, education, training courses, wage
scales, changes in wage scales, performance evaluation scores, marital status, gender, part-time work, and
being rehired. 2. Reported coeEcients measure the e1ect on the log hazard and ought to be interpreted
as follows: A unit change in a covariate x changes the log hazard by the amount of x , where x is the
estimated coeEcient of covariate x. Since a unit change in x changes the hazard by approximately  ∗ 100%
for values of  close to zero, we can interpret coeEcients of categorical variables as semi-elasticities. 3. The
column labelled “p-value” reports the p-values for the test that the coeEcient in the second period equals
the point estimate of the coeEcient in the 0rst period, to give an indication whether coeEcients di1er in the
two sub-periods. 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes that the coeEcient is signi0cant at
the 5% level, two asterisks denote signi0cance at the 1% level. 5. Schooling variables are de0ned in Table 2.
The training course variables count the number of internal or external training courses that either have been
successfully completed by a worker since January 1987 or that had been completed before January 1987.
The latter set of variables is time invariant in the regression model.
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Fig. 4. Age e1ects. (a) Blue-collar workers and (b) white-collar workers.
Notes: Workers in the reference group are 35 years of age. CoeEcient estimates that di1er signi0cantly
at the 1%-level are marked by triangles. A + denotes signi0cance at the 5%-level. A square indicates that
the coeEcient in the second period di1ers signi0cantly (1%-level) from the coeEcient point estimate in the
0rst period.
T.J. Dohmen, G.A. Pfann / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 645–663 661
in other studies, we 0nd that hazard rates decline for workers in their forties and drop
markedly at the age of 50. This drop is even more severe in the period of downsizing
for blue-collar workers.
During the period of expansion, the hazard rate rises again for workers aged
54–59, and it jumps at the age of 60 when most workers retire to take advantage
of an institutionalized early retirement scheme. During downsizing, when the 0rm of-
fers early retirement plans or buyouts for workers aged 55 or older, the hazard jumps
up for workers aged 55 and remains high thereafter. 25 The value of the option to wait
for becoming eligible for early retirement seems to be highest for workers aged 50–54
and their separation probabilities are, consequently, lowest. 26 This result has important
personnel policy implications for the design of early retirement plans. Early retire-
ment schemes have strong spill-over e1ect on slightly younger workers that should be
taken into account. Downsizing 0rms may want to o1er less generous early retirement
schemes to a broader group of workers in order to retain productive workers.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a case history analysis of worker mobility and compared the
characteristics of turnover between prosperous and diminishing periods of a 0rm. We
believe that many of the characteristics of turnover that we 0nd are similar across 0rms
so that we can learn something about other 0rms from our analysis. Our estimation
results con0rm many predictions of turnover models that relate inter alia to the e1ect
of tenure, training, occupation, or part-time work. In addition, our results show that
nonstationary forces cause relative separation rates to change.
Performance evaluation scores gain importance for blue-collar workers in periods of
downsizing. In our data, this e1ect is not found for white-collar workers. Less than
2% of all workers get performance evaluation score in the lower third of the scale,
but they face substantially higher job separation hazards. When turnover rates are high,
as in periods of downsizing, individual separation hazards are much lower for those in
the upper four deciles of the performance evaluation score distribution.
Career paths within the 0rm exhibit a dependence relation with a worker’s turnover
probability. The more frequently a blue-collar worker is promoted, the less likely he
becomes to separate. This e1ect is stronger during expansion. The 0rst promotion is
important to lower a white-collar worker’s turnover hazard during prosperous periods of
the 0rm, but promotions do not matter in bad times. However, workers who experienced
a demotion become much more likely to separate when the prospects of the 0rm
worsen.
25 These early retirement plans guarantee workers an income stream of 85% of their last wage at Fokker
as they receive a lump sum payment that is worth the capitalized value of 15% of their last wage for the
time until they turn 60, when they become eligible for the “regular” early retirement scheme. In addition to
this payment from the 0rm, social security provisions provides for an income stream of 70% of the last net
wage until they enter into regular retirement.
26 Stock and Wise (1990) also 0nd sharp discontinuous jumps in retirement rates at speci0c ages.
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A 0nal result of our study concerns the e1ect of age on separation rates, which
is – driven by changes of the value of the retirement option – marked by important
discontinuities, so that 0tting a quadratic age e1ect may produce misleading results.
As option values for retirement schemes change dramatically with the prospects of the
0rm, workers kill the option to retire early more frequently in periods of downsizing.
However, if early retirement is o1ered only beyond a certain age, the option to retire
early at a given age has important spill-over e1ects for slightly younger workers who,
as a result, become less likely to separate. A downsizing 0rm should take this crowding
out e1ect into account when designing early retirement plans. The role of retirement
and its relation to worker turnover rates deserves a more careful treatment in future
work on corporate downsizing and worker mobility.
Acknowledgements
This work has bene0ted from comments and suggestions on earlier drafts by James
Brown, Joop Hartog, Guido Imbens, Boyan Jovanovic, Steve Pischke, Kathryn Shaw,
Gerard van den Berg, Jan van Ours, and an anonymous referee. We would also like
to thank seminar participants at Maastricht University, St. Gerlach, the IZA Summer
School in Buch, the NAKE day in Amsterdam, the University of Aarhus, the annual
meetings of the Society of Labor Economists in Austin, and the annual meetings of the
European Economic Society in Lausanne. The authors like to thank Fokker’s bankruptcy
trustees, especially Mr. Ben KnUuppe, for making the personnel data available, and Mr.
Louis Deterink for sharing with us his profound knowledge and insights on corporate
through-starts. Gerard Pfann thanks the N.W.O. PIONIER program for 0nancial support.
Thomas Dohmen acknowledges 0nancial support from N.W.O. and SWOL. All errors
are our own.
References
Becker, G.S., 1962. Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Political Economy
70 (5), 9–49.
Deterink, A., KnUuppe, B., Leuftink, A., Schimmelpenninck, R., 1997. Bankruptcy trustees’ investigation of
the causes of the bankruptcy of N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Vliegtuigfabriek Fokker. Fokker Aircraft
B.V. and Fokker Administration B.V. Kluwer, Deventer.
du Bois, M., 1995. Aircraft maker Fokker faces a bumpy ride as Netherlands, DASA begin bailout talks.
Wall Street Journal Europe, September 4.
Dustmann, C., Meghir, C., 1998. Wages, experience and seniority. IFS Working Paper W99/1.
Farber, H.S., 1994. The analysis of inter0rm worker mobility. Journal of Labor Economics 12 (4), 554–593.
Gautier, P.A., van den Berg, G.J., van Ours, J.C., Ridder, G., 1999. Separations at the 0rm level. In:
Haltiwanger, J.C., Lane, J.I., Spletzer, J.R., Theeuwes, J.J., Troske, K.R. (Eds.), Contributions to Economic
Analysis: The Creation and Analysis of Employer–Employee Matched Data, Vol. 241. Elsevier Science,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Hall, R.E., Lazear, E.P., 1984. The excess sensitivity of layo1s and quits to demand. Journal of Labor
Economics 2 (2), 223–257.
Hamermesh, D.S., Pfann, G.A., 1996. Adjustment costs in factor demand. Journal of Economic Literature
34 (3), 1264–1292.
T.J. Dohmen, G.A. Pfann / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 645–663 663
Imbens, G.W., 1994. Transition models in a non-stationary environment. Review of Economics and Statistics
76 (4), 703–720.
Jovanovic, B., 1979a. Job matching and the theory of turnover. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5),
972–990.
Jovanovic, B., 1979b. Firm-speci0c capital and turnover. Journal of Political Economy 87 (6), 1246–1260.
Kuhn, P.J., Robert, J., 1989. Seniority and distribution in a two-worker trade union. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 104 (3), 485–508.
Lazear, E.P., 1979. Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy 87 (6), 1261–1284.
Mortensen, D.T., 1978. Speci0c capital and labor turnover. Bell Journal of Economics 9 (2), 572–586.
Mortensen, D.T., Pissarides, C.A., 1994. Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment.
Review of Economic Studies 61 (3), 397–415.
Oi, W.Y., 1962. Labor as a quasi-0xed factor. Journal of Political Economy 70 (6), 538–555.
Pfann, G.A., 2001. Options to quit. Economics Letters 70 (2), 259–265.
Prescott, E.C., Visscher, M., 1980. Organization capital. Journal of Political Economy 88 (3), 446–461.
Stock, J.H., Wise, D.A., 1990. Pensions, the option value of work, and retirement. Econometrica 58 (5),
131–159.
Teulings, C., Hartog, J., 1998. Corporatism or Competition? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
